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1. Introduction
This essay will offer a reassessment of the moral psychological and 
ethical implications of the debates between Buddhism and Neo-Confucianism 
that occurred during the decisive period of the end of the Goryeo (高麗) 
dynasty and formation of the early Joseon (朝鮮) dynasty.1 The debates 
and decisions of this epoch resulted in the hegemonic dominance of 
Neo-Confucianism and the marginalization of Buddhism that had 
previously been a state religion in Korea.2
 1 I would like to thank Halla Kim and Jin Y. Park for their encouragement and 
opportunity to present this work in public. Note that in this essay, I rely on Charles 
Muller’s online versions of his forthcoming edition and translation of the two texts 
under discussion. They are available online at: http://www.acmuller.net/index.html. 
They are published in: A. Charles Muller, Korea's Great Buddhist-Confucian Debate: The 
Treatises of Chong Tojon (Sambong) and Hamho Tuktong (Kihwa) (Honolulu: University 
of Hawaii Press, 2015).
 2 On the decline of Korean Buddhism, see James Huntley Grayson, Korea: A Religious 
History (New York: Routledge, 2002), 184. Buddhism was marginalized among the 
political and scholarly elites during the Joseon period, and has seen a remarkable revival 
since its demise. On the modern renewal of Korean Buddhism, see the essays in Jin Y. 
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I examine in this paper how texts such as the Array of Critiques against 
Buddhism (Bulssi Japbyeon 佛氏雜辨) of the politician and Confucian 
thinker Jeong Dojeon (鄭道傳, penname Sambong 삼봉, 三峰; 1342- 1398) 
and The Exposition of the Correct (Hyeonjeong non 顯正論) by the Sŏn 
(C. Chan 禪) Buddhist monk Gihwa (기화, 己和; Hamheo Deuktong 涵虚得
通; 1376-1433) offer different interpretations of the project of self-cultivation 
in relation to established forms of social relationships, the moral 
psychology of the emotions, and the problems of evil and suffering.3
Drawing on earlier Neo-Confucian critiques of Buddhism, Jeong argued 
that Buddhism is an intrinsically flawed way of life insofar as it undermines 
proper social relationships and their hierarchies, ignores natural human 
emotions and their appropriate cultivation in achieving the ethical 
personhood of the exemplary person (C. junzi, K. kunja 君子), and relies 
on superstitious and speculative ideas such as the ideas of rebirth and 
karma to explain human suffering and install fear among the masses. 
Buddhism appears in both its vulgar karmic and elite antinomian 
manifestations to be contrary to the natural tendencies of things and 
humans, as Jeong envisioned—based on the Sino-Korean interpretation of 
Mengzi (孟子) and the Yijing (易經)—the cosmos to be a natural-ethical 
whole that is enacted and reenacted in cultivated forms of ritual life that 
Park, Makers of Modern Korean Buddhism (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
2010).
 3 Despite English-language translations being available online, there has been surprisingly 
little discussion of these important texts. Previous English-language accounts of the 
debate include: Yeon-sik Choi, “To survive as a Buddhist Monk in a Confucian State: 
Gihwa’s Response to Jeong Do-jeon’s Critique of Buddhism.” Korea Journal 47 (2007): 
104-133; Charles Muller, “The Centerpiece of the Goryeo-Joseon Buddhist-Confucian 
Confrontation: A Comparison of the Positions of the Bulssi japbyeon and the Hyeonjeong 
non.” 韓國佛教學 9 (2003): 23-46.
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personally and socially follow, cultivate, and perfect the natural rhythms, 
seasonality, and temporality (C. shi, K. si 時) of life.
Gihwa belonged to the Imje Sŏn (臨齊禪) lineage that promoted hwadu 
(“critical phrase” 話頭) kong'an (公安) meditation. Gihwa’s response to 
Neo-Confucian critiques of Buddhism does not reject or polemicize against 
Confucianism as such. Confucianism s encompassed as a valuable moral 
perspective within a broader more comprehensive Buddhist whole. Gihwa 
articulated how Buddhism is capable of developing and incorporating 
multiple and diverse practices, methods, and forms of thought and feeling 
through “skillful means” (C. fangbian, K. pangp'yŏn 方便) that differentiate 
and address various levels and ways of understanding in order to promote 
awakening in diverse settings. The two authors’ divergent understandings 
of “moral psychology” and models of self-cultivation inform how they 
evaluate the respective merits and failures of Confucian and Buddhist 
projects as socially embodied practices that presuppose and rework the 
emotions in improving or perfecting the self.
While Jeong focused on the incommensurability of Buddhism and 
Confucianism, Gihwa denied that Buddhism is a position vis-à-vis 
Confucianism. It is a transformative way that can incorporate and 
transcend positions, including its own position. In eclectically or 
pluralistically recognizing the unity of the three teachings (C. sanjiao, K. 
samkyo 三教) of Buddhism, Confucianism, and Daoism, Buddhism 
reveals itself to be more than one teaching or perspective. It can both 
recognize the natural moral sensibilities presupposed in Confucianism 
and provide ways of realizing Confucianism’s own project of becoming 
a sage (C. shengren, K. sŏngin 聖人) as a spontaneous and responsive 
ethical condition.
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2. Intercultural and Interasian Philosophy
Intercultural philosophy is increasingly perceived as a necessary task 
for philosophy. 
This task is typically interpreted to broaden and open philosophy in 
a way that still presupposes Western philosophy to set the standard of 
what counts as philosophy. It is the normative model according to which 
other philosophies are judged and evaluated. 
The word “philosophy” has a Greek origin and a “Western”—and often 
underemphasized Middle Eastern—history, only being introduced into 
East Asia through its encounter with the west. Still, the matter to be 
thought that it names has a broader intention than Western intellectual 
history or the Western history of metaphysics. The history of Buddhist 
thought in East Asia, for instance, provides multiple examples of the 
prospects and risks of philosophizing across cultural differences.
It is sometimes argues that the west is transcultural and multicultural 
in a way that other cultures and civilizations are not. We might ask: has 
there and can there be transcultural thinking in East Asia? For example, 
we might consider the encounters, confrontations, and adaptations 
between Buddhist and Confucian philosophies that have taken place 
since the introduction of Buddhism into East Asian cultures.
Confucian thinkers often regarded Buddhism with suspicion as an alien 
tradition introduced from South and Central Asia. Buddhists in China, 
Korea, Japan, and Vietnam—but especially in China and Korea where 
Neo-Confucianism became a dominant ideological force—were forced to 
justify or excuse the legitimacy of taking up a form of life and thought 
adopted from the “West”: South and Central Asia. One strategy was to 
Sinicize the Buddha into a Chinese sage by claiming he was Laozi after 
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he left China. 
Other Buddhist thinkers decentering the center: Another strategy was 
to deemphasize notions of “center,” “East” and “West”, barbarian and 
non-barbarian. This strategy, along with the argument for the inner 
harmony of the three teachings of Buddhism, Confucianism, and Daoism 
occurs in The Exposition of the Correct (Hyeonjeong non 顯正論) of the 
Sŏn Buddhist monk Gihwa (己和, 1376–1433) whose personal name was 
Hamheo Deuktong (涵虛得通).
Jeong Dojeon 鄭道傳 was a leading Confucian intellectual and political 
figure of the late Goryeo (고려, 高麗) and early Joseon (朝鮮) period. As 
the author of Array of Critiques against Buddhism (Bulssi Japbyeon 佛氏
雜辨), he is considered a merely ideological, political, and repressive 
figure by his Buddhist critics. Yet he remains popular in Confucian and 
Korean historically-oriented popular traditions, after being vilified for a 
long time by the Joseon dynasty that he helped found, even appearing 
on Korean TV in a historical drama series devoted to his life.
Gihwa did not have a television series made about his life, though 
there is one about his teacher Muhak Jacho (無學自超; 1327-1405). In the 
context of critiques such as his Array of Critiques against Buddhism, 
Gihwa remarked:
“‘East’ and ‘West’ are nothing more than names that are applied to this or that 
place according to the situation. There is no such thing as occupying the center 
and determining East and West” (Gihwa, HBJ 7.223b15). East, West, and Center 
are conditional orientations rather than absolute positions. Merleau-Ponty said of 
philosophy: “Its center is everywhere, its circumference nowhere.”4
 4 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Signs (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), 128.
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It would be anachronistic to identify Gihwa’s statements with current 
debates about multiculturalism or identity politics, yet they do indicate a 
kind of transcultural thinking that cannot be limited by national origin or 
character. Gihwa’s argument concerns the judgments about the other’s 
way based on tribal origin. He remarked:
If we do not respect the Way of the Buddha because he is a barbarian, shall 
we also not respect the Ways of Shun, who was born among the Eastern tribes, 
and King Wen, who was born among the Western tribes? Can we disparage a 
person’s Way just on the basis of their being foreign? [It should be based on] 
the results of their works and the Way which governed their behavior (Gihwa, 
HBJ 7.223b15).
Sino-Korean debates between Neo-Confucianism and Buddhism often 
involved the foreignness of Buddhism and its appropriateness in China 
and East Asia. Jeong Dojeon cites two scholars referring to the Buddha 
as a barbarian. Yet his main argument does not rest on the foreignness 
of the Buddha. Jeong turned the Buddhist universalist claim around 
against itself when he claimed that the Buddha’s foreignness cannot 
excuse the Buddha’s flawed understanding of humanity and his 
inadequate practice of benevolence:
Although the Buddha was a foreigner, he was still a human being. So how 
could he alone lack this heart-mind? (Jeong, 80c).
Jeong belonged to the activist-reformist tradition of Confucianism that 
appealed to Mengzi’s ethico-political “people-centered” (C. minben, K. 
minbon 民本) insights strongly rooted in an account of nurturing and 
activating the goodness inherent in human nature.5 The heart-mind that 
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is identified with the four sprouts of human nature by Mengzi appears 
to be lacking in the Buddha’s teaching. The Buddha’s practice of 
benevolence is imperfect in its disregard for our emotional connections 
with those who should be closest to us. Jeong’s critique centers on the 
universality of the heart-mind (C. xin, K. sim 心) in the nature of all 
humans rather than the foreignness of the teaching as such, since even 
foreigners have the sprout of compassion articulated by Mengzi as 
leading to the attunement of benevolence.
The Array of Jeong Dojeon and The Exposition of Gihwa need to be 
interpreted in the context of early Joseon politics and the ideological 
consolidation of Neo-Confucianism and the declining political fortunes of 
Buddhism. We also see, however, genuine argumentation that should be 
considered philosophical in that it addresses issues of ontology, cosmology, 
and—in particular—ethics and moral psychology. There is intellectual 
content to this dispute between these different interpretations concerning 
human nature and the cosmos and how best to live and flourish amidst 
the changing phases— interpreted through the five elements or phases 
(C. wuxin, K. ohaeng 五行), yinyang (K. ŭmyang 陰陽) theory, the Yijing, 
and so forth—or interconnected interdependent karmic nexus of life.
3. Suffering, Evil, and the Emotions
Questions of the causes and conditions for evil and suffering have 
been posed across multiple philosophical and religious traditions. We 
might ask in the context of these two texts: Why do suffering and evil 
 5 See Sŭng-hwan Yi, A Topography of Confucian Discourse: Politico-Philosophical 
Reflections on Confucian Discourse since Modernity (Paramus, NJ: Homa Sekey Books, 
2005), 79.
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befall persons and sentient beings in the way that they do? Is it karma 
or the mediation of virtue and destiny described in the Sino-Korean 
tradition through paradigmatic works such as the Yijing?
The role of the emotions and “moral psychology” are key elements in 
cultivating an appropriate way of life in both Confucianism and Buddhism, 
even as they dispute their nature, role, and scope. We can consequently 
pose the questions: Are emotions intrinsically moral or “good” such that 
they need cultivation into a proper form of life that is emotionally 
balanced and responsive to the natural and human orders and their 
hierarchies? Or should the emotions be unfolded in response to karmic 
conditioning into unlimited compassion for all sentient beings? 
The problems of “evil” and suffering play significant roles in Sino-Korean 
debates between Neo-Confucianism and Buddhism. We can well inquire: 
Is there a problem of evil in East Asian thought that has the same 
function or is parallel to the role of theodicy (“God’s justice”) in Western 
thought?6 There are questions in these two texts of how and why suffering 
happens and whether suffering is connected with moral virtue and vice, 
merit and fault. Each author raised the problem of suffering in response 
to the other tradition. According to Jeong, Buddhist karma is an inadequate 
explanation of suffering. Buddhism blames the victims for things outside 
of their control and power through the doctrine of karma, and is cruel 
in its understanding of karmic fate and hells.7 For Gihwa, however, 
 6 On the problem of evil outside Western philosophy, compare Franklin Perkins, Heaven 
and Earth Are Not Humane: The Problem of Evil in Classical Chinese Philosophy 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2014).
 7 Jeong critiques the popular understanding of karma without considering more sophisticated 
accounts that are precisely concerned with issues such as complicity and suffering. 
Compare the discussion of karma in: Eric S. Nelson, “Questioning Karma, Buddhism and 
the Phenomenology of the Ethical.” Journal of Buddhist Ethics: Revisioning Karma, 2005: 
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Confucianism lacks an adequate sense of the suffering and interconnectedness 
of sentient beings. He strongly emphasizes the problem of animal suffering, 
which he argues is repressed in Confucianism, in describing his own 
conversion from Confucianism to Buddhism as a more comprehensive 
and fundamental teaching.
4. The Trouble with Buddhism
Drawing on earlier Sino-Korean “school of principle” (C. lixue, K. lihak 
理學) Neo-Confucian critiques of Buddhism, particularly Zhu Xi 朱熹, 
Jeong Dojeon argued that Buddhism is an intrinsically flawed way of life 
insofar as it undermines proper natural and social relationships and their 
appropriate hierarchies, ignores natural emotions and their appropriate 
cultivation in achieving the ethical personhood of the exemplary person, 
manipulates the people through fear through its images of hells and 
karmic retribution, and relies on superstitious and speculative ideas in its 
popular forms such as rebirth, transmigration, and karma, while its elite 
forms are antinomian, nihilistic, and involve arbitrary personal excesses.
Jeong maintained that Buddhism is inadequate to the real problems of 
suffering it aims to overcome. His argument can be reconstructed using 
vocabulary from Western accounts of the problem of evil. In Jeong’s 
interpretation of Buddhism, “physical evil” is suffering and “moral evil” is 
due to the lack of merit producing activities and lack of faith. The 
consequences of this lack are karmic retribution, including numerous hell 
regions and rebirth. The explanation is the “metaphysical evil” of karma. 
353-373; Eric S. Nelson, “The Complicity of the Ethical: Causality, Karma, and Violence 
in Buddhism and Levinas.” Leah Kalmanson, Frank Garrett and Sarah Mattice, Levinas 
and Asian Thought (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2013), 99-114.
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The problem with karma is that it blames and punishes those who are 
not responsible, since they have been karmically conditioned, and it 
threatens excessive punishment that creates a deficient moral psychology 
based in fear and anxiety. Thus, he gives the example that the criminal 
should be cained rather than threatened with being sent to hell. Hell 
does not exist, and even if it does exist there is—according to Confucianism 
in this case—no constant self that endures past this life to go to hell. 
Jeong employs a Confucian notion of a relational and temporally finite 
self to reject the fiction of a self that continues over multiple lifetimes.
Based in the Confucian understanding of the emotions in moral life, 
Jeong argues that Buddhism undermines appropriate moral emotions 
(such as morally based disgust, contempt, disdain, etc.) while creating 
excessive emotions in the general population (such as fear and resentment) 
and in its elite practitioners (such as arbitrariness).8 Jeong employs an 
argumentative strategy similar to Western critics of religious belief, such 
as Hume and Nietzsche’s arguments about the moral psychology of 
punishment in religion, and draws on his interpretation of the moral 
psychology of taste in Mengzi in offering the following anecdote to 
support his case that Buddhism distorts ethical taste and judgment by 
utilizing fear and anxiety rather than resolving them in the balanced 
heart-mind:
 8 On the significance of the emotions and negative emotions in Confucian moral 
psychology, see Eric S. Nelson, “Resentment in Western and Confucian Philosophy,” in 
Jeanne Riou and Mary Gallagher, ed., Re-thinking Ressentiment: On the Limits of 
Criticism and the Limits of its Critics (Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2014); Eric S. Nelson, 
“Recognition and Resentment in the Confucian Analects.” Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 
41, 2, 2013, 287-306; and Eric S. Nelson, “The Question of Resentment in Nietzsche and 
Confucian Ethics.” Taiwan Journal of East Asian Studies, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Issue 19), June 
2013: 17-51.
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A monk asked, “If there were no hell, what could be used to frighten people 
from doing evil?” I said, “the liking of goodness and the dislike of evil seen in 
the exemplary person, is like ‘liking an attractive color, and disliking a 
repugnant odor,’ —they arise from within oneself and there is no contrived 
intent that brings these feelings out. Once one has an evil reputation, then 
his/her mind is filled with shame. If one receives a public caning, why does he 
or she need the teaching of hell in order to not behave in an evil manner?” 
(Jeong, 82a).
5. On Responding to Misfortune
Buddhism is, in both its “popular” fear-based karmic and “elite” 
antinomian manifestations, contrary to natural ethical and moral psychological 
tendencies in Jeong’s naturalistically oriented critique. Jeong envisioned 
the cosmos instead as a natural-ethical whole that is enacted and 
reenacted in cultivated forms of ritual life in the individual and community. 
Suffering and evil are due to departing from the fabric of virtue and 
destiny. They are due to excess and deficiency in the changing character 
of things and persons, as described in the Yijing and traditional works 
on yinyang and the five phases.
Imbalance and suffering in life are unavailable and call for a proper 
emotional response so that one remains unafflicted and ethically motivated 
even in the midst of misfortune. Jeong’s depiction of Confucianism on 
suffering can be reconstructed in the following terms: “Physical evil” is 
suffering and “moral evil” is the lack of virtue and appropriateness. The 
consequences of moral evil are personal and social imbalances that 
perpetuate and heighten suffering. The explanation for this cycle lies in 
the changing patterns of vital forces. 
The virtuous tend to be more fortunate because of their moral psychology, 
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yet there is no underlying or absolute correlation of virtue and misfortune. 
The problem then cannot be resolved by advocating karma. Instead of 
blaming individuals for bad karma, one should adopt to the changing 
world. That is, the exemplary person is not excessive in fortune or 
misfortune. Fortune and misfortune are largely contingent beyond one’s 
own sphere of virtue. One can only adopt oneself to the situation as one 
does to the changing of the seasons. Confucianism cultivates appropriate 
emotions and balanced emotional states that lead one to be sympathetic 
to others by extending from nearest to farthest. An emotionally balanced 
and non-excessive life is a necessary condition, if not sufficient, for virtue 
and well-being.
Liberation from fear and anxiety is necessary for the establishment of 
tranquility and benevolence. How do exemplary people deal with misfortune 
and fortune? They correct their own mind and nothing more. They 
cultivate the self, nothing else. Fortune need not be sought to be obtained, 
and misfortune need not be avoided for one to keep it at a distance. 
Jeong refers to the Confucian idea that: “The exemplary person experiences 
a lifetime of trouble without a moment of anxiety” (Jeong, 82b). If 
misfortune comes to one from the outside, one goes along with it, and 
that’s it. It is like the cold and hot weather passing before us, which we 
cannot control and that have no direct relation to ourselves.
6. Gihwa’s Response
Jeong argues that Buddhism fails in achieving tranquility and its 
tranquility is disconnected from what matters in an emotionally balanced 
and just social life. Gihwa maintained that the three teachings are 
encompassed as valuable perspectives within a broader more comprehensive 
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Buddhist vision. His argumentation on behalf of synthesis was based on 
Buddhist conceptions of “essence-function” (C. tiyong, K. che-yong 體用) 
and the “mutual interpenetration of phenomena” (C. shishi wuai, K. sa-sa 
mu-ae 事事無礙).9 Gihwa criticizes Confucian virtues and arguments for 
their partiality and limitation, reinterpreting them in a more universal 
perspective of essence and interdependence that he associated with the 
inner truth of Buddhism.
Universalization is the key to Gihwa’s argument for Buddhism, as he 
stressed both the universality of the message and the universality of the 
experience of suffering, including the animal suffering that has been 
forgotten in conventional Confucianism: 
This doubt [about Confucian humaneness] was buried within my mind for a 
long time without being resolved. Then, while traveling around Samgak-san in 
1396, I arrived to Seungga-sa, where I had the chance to chat with an old Sŏn 
monk throughout the night. The monk said: “The Buddha has ten grave 
precepts, the first of which is to not take life.” Upon hearing this explanation, 
my mind was suddenly overturned, and I recognized for myself that this was 
indeed the behavior of the truly humane person. I was hereupon able to deeply 
embody the teachings of the Way of humanity. From this time forth, I was 
never again to be confused regarding the differences between Confucianism and 
Buddhism… (Gihwa, HBJ 7.220a14)
Gihwa indicates that we should examine the full range and scope of 
the ethical in each philosophy: Do compassion and responsiveness apply 
only to some select beings or all sentient beings? He claimed:
 9 See A. Charles Muller, “The Key Operative Concepts in Korean Buddhist Syncretic 
Philosophy: Interpenetration (通達) and Essence-Function (體用) in Wŏnhyo, Chinul and 
Kihwa.” Bulletin of Toyo Gakuen University No. 3, March 1995: 33-48.
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All creatures are like this, sharing in the same inherent spiritual awareness. 
Furthermore sharing in the emotion of loving life and hating to be killed, how 
do they differ from human beings? Hearing the sound of ripping flesh and the 
cutting of the knife, they are in utter fright as they approach their death. Their 
eyes are wild and they cry out in agony. How could they not harbor bitter and 
resentful sentiments? And yet people are able to turn a deaf ear. In this way 
human beings and the creatures of the world affect each other without 
awareness and compensate each other without pause. If there were a humane 
person present, how could he/she observe such suffering and continue to act as 
if nothing was wrong?”(Gihwa, HBJ 7.220b4).
What then is the relationship between karma and compassion that 
Confucian critics of Buddhism have placed into doubt? Gihwa’s argument 
can be reconstructed by using the following distinctions. “Physical evil” 
indicates the universality of suffering. “Moral evil” is the lack of insight 
in our own participation in the reproduction of suffering and lack of 
universalized compassion. The explanation is karma as a moral-causal 
logic that requires a change in attitude about suffering and the liberation 
from karma. The evidence for karmic causality rests on stories of karmic 
rebirth such that hells and karmic consequences are real. The motivation 
for this analysis is not to frighten but to liberate. Buddhists do not wish 
bad karmic consequences on anyone; they wish liberation from the 
sources of those consequences. Misfortunes are unwanted and their 
suffering is real, yet they also indicate turning points for eliminating 
suffering by cultivating an attunement of spontaneous awareness and 
compassion.
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7. Conclusion: Human Nature and “Moral Psychology”
Two conceptions of human nature and the emotions are at work in this 
debate: For Jeong, nature is ordered as a whole, but finite (one birth and 
death) and governed by cycles outside of human responsibility and 
choice. Famine is due to flux in vital forces, not previous bad deeds. 
One needs to control, manage, and balance personal, social, and natural 
life. This can be done through following a work such as the Yijing, 
which—following Zhu Xi—has a naturalistic and practical for Jeong rather 
than a metaphysical and supernatural character. In Gihwa’s account, by 
contrast, nature is ordered as a whole and in its macrocosmic and 
microcosmic correlations; it is knowable through traditional Sino-Korean 
conceptions of the five phases, yinyang, the Yijing, and so on; but more 
fundamentally through the Buddhist experience of dependent origination 
and karma.
There are two conflicting conceptions of the heart-mind as responsiveness 
to suffering at play in the debate between Neo-Confucianism and Buddhism. 
From the Neo-Confucian Perspective, Buddhism limits and undermines 
the heart-mind and natural moral affections that are the basis of a 
balanced life and a just social order. Emotions are extended outwards in 
greater circles into one body, but the near has priority over the far, the 
elder deserves more respect than the young.
From Gihwa’s Buddhist perspective, which defends both popular and 
Sŏn Buddhism in response to Jeong’s Neo-Confucian criticisms, he 
answers by arguing that limited and partial conceptions of Confucianism 
limit the heart-mind, and the compassion and humaneness that it 
valorizes, by not embracing sentient beings as a whole. Buddhism does 
not so much reject and repress partial and limited forms of love through 
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fear; it expands and encompasses the emotions in practicing unrestricted 
compassion, generosity, and loving kindness. Jeong’s concerns were 
legitimate given the fallenness of actual Buddhist practices even as he 
failed to appropriately address core Buddhist experiences and ideas.
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